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UNITED STATES
Vo

Federal/Criminal

NAFTALIN
1.

SUMMARY:

The issue in this case is whether§ 17(a)(l) of the

--

Securities Act of 1933, 15

.

Timely (by ext.)

u.s.c.

§ 77q(a) (1), proscribes fraud where the

victim of such activity is a broker rather than an investor.
2.

FACTS & DECISIONS BELOW:

broker-dealer firm.

Resp is the principal in a registered

This case involves a . "short selling" scheme.

Resp

placed orders to sell stocks for the firm's account which the firm did
not own.

He rnisrep.)?€"5ented the firm as being "long" in the particular

--£ wov\d

c;Av:,cu~~ wr\h

a "'._.., -\uw..-.:1 __:r~~

- 2 stockso

Under SEC regulations a broker may execute an order to sell

a customer's shares immediately upon request if the seller owns the
security ordered to be sold and will deliver the security as soon as
possible.

Resp was gambling that there would be a swift decline in the
I

'

stocks' prices, enabling him to buy back the stocks necessary to cover th
('

l

.

transaction while realizing a profit.

·..

The market did not cooperate.

The stock prices rose and resp was unable to deliver the securities that
he had promised.
$1,000,000.

~

brokers who made the sales for resp lost roughly

Resp was indicted and convicted for violations of§ 17(a)

(1) of the Securities Act of 1933.
The CA 8 reversed.

It conceded that resp had acted fraudulently,

but concluded that the government must show some fmpact on an investor
in order to make out a case under§ 17(a) (1).
(

It characterized that

section as solely an attempt to "protect investors from fraudulent
practices in the sale of securities."

App. at 6a-7a.

Since resp' s

fraud injured brokers rather than investors, the CA held that his
culpability could not be premised on that section.

The CA also reversed

resp's conviction on the sixth count of the indictment, Judge Ross
dissenting, although that count involved fraud on a broker who traded
on his own account as an investor.

It held that the indictment did

not allege that the defrauded broker was a purchaser.

The SG disagrees

with the disposition of count 6, but states that the holding is limited
~

to the facts of this case and therefore he does not seek review of that
disposition here.

- 3 3o

CONTENTIONS:

The SG argues that theCA's holding "effectively

removes federal criminal prohibitions against fraudulent securities
schemes in which the fraudulent statements are made to financial institutions serving as intermediaries in securities transactions.''
6.

Petn at

He contends that this result is inconsistent with the plain language

of the statute.
Section 17 (a) (1) provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person in the
offer or sale of any securities by the use of any
means or instruments of transportation or communication in interstate commerce or by the use of
the mails, directly or indirectly --

(1) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice
to defraud. • • •
11

By its terms the section applies to all fraudulent practices in the offer
or sale of any securities.

11

An offer is defined in

§

2 (3) of the 1933

Securities Act as "every attempt or offer to dispose of • • • a security

..•

for value.

11

The SG contends that here resp placed sell orders

for value with various brokers and employed a scheme to defraud in the
course of placing those orders.
squarely covered by the Act.

He concludes that resp's conduct is

Since hothing on the face of the statute

limits its coverage to fraud on investors, it should not be read so
restrictively by the courts.

He adds that this Court has often held

that the securities laws should be interpreted broadly to effectuate
their remedial purposes.
Inc., 375

u.s.

~,

180, 195 (1963).

SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau,

- 4 ,;_

,

J'

The SG adds that what happened here can be construed as fraud
investors.

against

A loss to investors is averted in cases such

as this by the securities regulation which requires brokers to "buy in"
realJhares to deliver to the buyer who agreed to purchase.

The buyer

therefore has the shares he contracted for before the seller actually
delivers the securities to the broker.
insure their customers against loss.

The brokers therefore effectively
That investors are insured against

loss from fraud does not, according to the SG, mean that they are not
the victims of fraud.

And like an insurance company, the brokers will

ultimately pass their losses on to their customerso
Resp observes that if theCA's opinion is likely to have the
dramatic consequences suggested by the SG, it is indeed strange that
/

this case is the only one of its type in the 45 years of the '33 Act.
The government lost this case because of a pleading mistake:

the SEC

relied on 17(a) instead of§ 10-b and Rule lOb-5 of the 1934 Act.

There

have been successful prosecutions of sim'i lar conduct under § 10-b.
United States v. Pelz, 433 F.2d 48 (2d Cir. 1970).

This case is over

nine years old and of nothing but limited historical interest.

Moreover,

the SEC has authority under§ lO(a) of the 1934 Act to promulgate rules
for the purpose of regulating short sales.Resp argues that theCA's
statutory interpretation is correct and fortified by the maxim that
criminal statutes are to be read narrowly.
4.

DISCUSSION:

---------

TheCA's reading of§ 17(a) does seem unduly

restrictive, and the authority relied on by the CA to bolster its inter-

- 5 pretation is extremely weak.

They cite FDR's message to Congress

describing the purpose of the '33 Act as " protect[ing] the public with
the least possible interference to honest business."

At root theCA's

position rests on a questionable reading of the statute and the maxim
that penal statutes are to be strictly construed.
TheCA 8's opinion is also inconsistent with the position taken
by theCA 2 in United States v. Brown, 555 F.2d 336 {1977), where conspirators counterfeited the stock of a corporation and exchanged the
bogus stock with the corporation's transfer agent for real stock
certificates of smaller denominations.

The latter stock was then placed

in a trading account and sold to and through New York brokerage houses.
Brown appealed his conviction under§ 17(a), arguing that that section
was inapplicable because the scheme here was to defraud the transfer
agent -- Manufacturers Hanover Trust Company
received legitimate securities.

and not investors, who

The CA rejected the argument:

While this court has noted that the primary purpose
of the 1933 Act was to protect investors, • • •
appellant has not cited and we have not found any
case holding that this was its sole purpose and
that unless the ultimate purchaser of securities
is injured or defrauded the criminal provisions
of§ [17(a)] are not violated. The language of
that section • • • broadly condemns the employment
of "any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud"
or the engagement "in any transaction, practice,
or course of business which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon the purchaser."
There can be no doubt that there was established
on trial a device, scheme or artifice to defraud.

*

*

*

[T]here is no doubt that Congress in the
broad language employed in§ [17(a)] was intent

- 6 upon protecting the integrity of the marketplace
in which securities are traded '.

~th

parties apparently argue that§

10~)

of the 1934 Act reaches

resp's conduct, although there are only a few cases on point.
A,T, Brod

&

Co. v. Perlow, 375 F.2d 393, 396-97 (CA 2 1967)

~,

(lOb-S

governs although victim-stockbroker not "investor"); United States v.
Pelz, 433 F.2d 48 (2d Cir. 1970).

The SG is concerned, however, that

given the similarity in language between§ lO(b) of the '34 Act and
§ 17(a) of the '33 Act, theCA 8's interpretation may have an adverse
impact on lO(b) prosecutions.
"in

t~e

The relevant language in§ 17(a) is fraud

offer or sale of any securities. 11

with manipulations or deception

11

Section 10 (b) is concerned

in connection with the purchase or sale. ''

The difference in wording is a fine distinction on which to build
different theories on the scope of protection.
There is a response,
11/29/78
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 78-561

I

United States, Petitioner, On Writ of Certiorari to the
v.
United States Court of Appeals
Neil T. Naftalin.
for the Eighth Circuit.
[May - , 1979]
MR. JusTICE BRENNAN delivered the opinion of the Court.
The question presented in this case is whether § 17 (a)(1)
of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U. S. C. § 77q (a)(1) , prohibits frauds against brokers as well as investors. We hold
that it does.
Respondent, Neil Naftalin , was the president of a registered broker-dealer firm and a professional investor. Between
July and August of 1969, Naftalin engaged in a fraudulent
"short selling" scheme. He selected stocks that, in his judgment, had peaked in price and were entering into a period of
market decline. He then placed with five brokers orders to
sell shares of these stocks, although he did not own the shares
he purported to sell. Gambling that the price of the securities would decline substantially before he was required to
deliver them , respondent planned to make off~tting purchases
through other brokers a.t lower prices. He intended to take
as profit the difference between the price at which he sold and
the price at which he· covered. Respondent was aware, however, tha.t had the brokers who executed his sell orders known
that he did not own the securities, they either would not have
accepted the orders, or would have required a margin deposit.
He therefore falsely represented that he owned the shares he
directed them to selJ.l
1

A broker may mark an order to sell a customer's shares "long" if he·

78-561-0PINION
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Unfortunately for respondent, the market . prices of the
securities he "sold" did not fall prior to the delivery date, but
instead rose sharply. He was unable to make covering purchases, and never delivered the promised securities. Consequently, the five brokers were unable to deliver the stock
which they had "sold" to investors, and were forced to borrow
stock to keep their delivery promises. Then, in order to
return the borrowed stock, the brokers had to purchase replacement shares on the open market at the now higher prices,
a process known as "buying in." 2 While the investors to
whom the stocks were sold were thereby shielded from direct
injury, the five brokers suffered substantial financial losses.
The United States District Court for the District of Min·
nesota found petitioner guilty on eight counts of employing
"a scheme and artifice to defraud" in the sale of securities,
in violation of § 17 (a) (1).~ App. ~4-25; App. to Pet. for
Cert. 15a-20. Although the Court of Appeals for the Eighth
Circuit found the evidence sufficient to establish that respondent had committed fraud , 579 F. 2d 444, 447 (1978),
it nonetheless vacated his convictions. Finding that the purpose of the Securities Act "was to protect investors from
fraudulent practices in the sale of securities," id., at 447, the
Court held that "the government must prove some impact of
the scheme on an investor," id., at 448. Since respondent's
fraud injured only brokers and not investors, the Court of
"is informed that the seller owns the security ordered to be sold and, as
soon as possible without undue inconvenience or expense, will deliver the
security . . . . " 17 CFR § 240.10a-1 (d) (1978).
2
If a broker executes a sell order marked "long" and the seller fails to
deliver the securities when due, under certain circumstances the broker
must " buy in" substitute ~ecmiti es. See 17 CFR § 240.10a- 2 (a) (1978) .
See also 2 L. Loss, Securities Regulation 1233-1235 (2cl eel . 1961) (hereinafter Loss) .
3
Willful violations of § 17 (a) are made subject to criminal sanctions by
§ 24 of the Secur~ties Act, 15 U. S. C. § 77x.

.! •
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Appeals concluded that Naftalin did not violate § 17 (a) (1),
We granted certiorari, - U. S . - (1978) , and now reverse.

I
Section 17 (a) of the Securities Act of 1933, subsection (1)
of which respondent was found to have violated, states :
"It shall be unlawful for any person in the offer or
sale of any securities by the use of any means or instruments of transportation or communication in inter·
state commerce or by the use of the mails, directly or
indirectly" ( 1) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to
defraud , or
"(2) to obtain money or property by means of
any untrue statement of a material fact or any omis·
sion to state a material fact necessary in order to
make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
" ( 3) to engage in any transaction , practice, or
course of business which operates or would operate
as a fraud or deceit upon the purchaser."
In this Court, N aftalin does not dispute that, by falsely representing that he owned the stock he sold, he defrauded the
brokers who executed his sales. Brief for Respondent 7-8,
11; Tr. of Oral Arg. 17-18. He contends, however, that the
Court of Appeals correctly held tha.t § 17 (a)(1) applies solely
to frauds directed against investors, and not to those against
brokers.
Nothing on the fact of the statute supports this reading of
it. Subsection ( 1) makes it unlawful for "any person in the
offer or sale of any securities ... directly or indirectly .. .
to employ any device, sch eme, or artifice to defraud ...."
(Emphasis added.) The statutory language does not require

7 -5GI-OPINION
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that the victim of thf' fraud be an investor-only that the
fraud occur "in" an offer or sale.
An offer and sale clearly occurred here. Respondent placf'd
sell orders with the brokers; the brokers. acting as agents.
executed the orders; and the r('sults were contracts of sale.
which are within the statutory definition, 15 U.S. C.~ 77h (3).
Moreover, the fraud occurred "in" the "offer" and "sale." 1
The statutory terms, which Congress expressly intended to
define broadly, see H. R. Rep. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess.. 11
(1933); 1 L. Loss, Securities Regulation 512 n. 163 (2d eel.,
1961) (hereinafter Loss); cf. SEC v. National Securities, Inc.,
393 U. S. 453. 467 n. 8 (1969). arc expansive enough to encompass th(' entire selling pmcess. inc] uding the seller I agent
trausaction. Section 2 (3) of the Act, 15 U. S. C. § 77b (3),
states :
"The term 'sale' ... shall include every contract of sale
or disposition of a security or interest in a Sf'Curity. for
value. The term ... 'offer' shall include every attempt
or offer to dispose of ... a security or interest in a security, for value." (Emphasis added.)
This language does not require that the fraud occur in any
particular phase of the selling transaction. At the very least,
an order to a broker to sell securities is certainly an "attempt
to dispose" of them.
Thus, nothing in subsection ( 1) of § 17 (a) creates a re·
4

Respondent contends that the requiremrnt that the fraud be "in"
the offer or sale connotes a narrower range of activities than does the
phrase "in connection with," which is found in § 10 (b) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U. S. C. § 78j (b). First, we are not neces,;arily
persuaded that "in" is narrower than "in connection with." Both Congress, see H. R. Rep. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess., 6 (1933), and this
Court, see Supt. of Insurance v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U. S. 6,
10 (1971), have on occasion used the terms interchangeably. But even
if "in" were meant to connote a narrower group of transactions than "in
connection with," there is nothing to indicate that "in" is narrower in the
sense in,;isted upon by Naftalin.

I I

.•

~,

I

J•

•
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5

quirement that injury occur to a purchaser. Respondent
nonetheless urges that the phrase, "upon the purchaser,"
found only in subsection (3) of § 17 (a), should be read into
all three subsections. The short answer is that Cougress did
not write the statute that way. Indeed, the fact that it did
not provides strong affirmative evidence that while impact
upon a purchaser may be relevant to prosecutions brought
under§ 17 (a)(3), it is not required for those brought under
§ 17 (a) ( 1). As is indicated by the use of the infinitive "to"
to introduce each of the three subsections, and the use of the
conjunction "or" at the end of the first two. each subsection
proscribes a distinct category of misconduct. 5 Each succeed~
ing prohibition is meant to cover additional kinds of illegalities-not to narrow the reach of the prior sections. See
United States v. Birrell, 266 F. Supp. 539. 542-543 (SDNY
1967). There is, therefore, "no warrant for narrowing alter.
native provisions which the legislature h~ts adopted with the
purpose of affording added safeguards." United States v. Gil.
liland, 312 U.S. 86, 93 (1941). 0

II
The court below placed primary reliance for its restrictive
interpretation of § 17 (a) (1) upon what it perceived to be
5 Moreover, while matters like "punctuation [are] not decisive of the
construction of a sta tute," Costanzo v. Tillinghast, 287 U. S. 341, 344
(1932), where they reaffirm conclusions drawn from the words themselves
they provide useful confirmation. Here the use of separate number~ to
introduce each subsection, and the fact that the phrase "upon the purchacSer" was set off solely as part of subsection (3), confirm our conclusion that "[n]othing on the face of the statute suggests a congressional
intent. to limit its coverage," United States v. Culbert, 435 U. S. 371, 373
(1978), to frauds against purchasers.
6 This case involves a criminal prosecution.
The decision in Blue Chip
Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U. S. 723 (197fi), which limited to
purchasers or sellers the class of plaintiffs who may bring private implied
causes of action under SEC Rule lOb-5, is therefore in applicable. See
SEC v. Natio11al Securities) Inc ., 393 U.S. 453, 467 n. 9 (1969).

78-561-0PINION
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Congress' purpose in passing the Securities Act. Noting that
both this Court and Congress have emphasized the importance
of the statute in protecting investors from fraudulent practices in the sa.Ie of securities, see Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder,
425 U. S. 185, 195 (1976), the Court of Appeals concluded
that "against this backdrop ... we are constrained to hold that
the government must prove some impact of the scheme on ai}
investor." 579 F. 2d, at 448.
But neither this Court nor Congress has ever suggested that
investor protection was the sole purpose of the Securities Act.
As we have noted heretofore, the Act "emerged as part of the
aftermath of the market crash in 1929." Ernst & Ernst v.
Hochfelder, supra, at 194. See generally 1 Loss 120- 121.
Indeed, Congress' primary contemplation was that regulation
of the securities markets might help set the economy on the
road to recovery. See 77 Cong. Rec. 2925 (remarks of Rep.
Kelly); id., at 2935 ( rema.rks of Rep. ,Chapman); id., at 3232
(remarks of Sen. Norbeck); H. R. Rep. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st
Sess., 2 (1933). Prevention of frauds against investors was
surely a key part of that program, but so was the effort '~to
achieve a high standard of business ethics ... in every facet
of the securities industry." SEC v. Capital Gains Bureau, 375
U . S. 180, 186- 187 (1963) (emphasis added). See Ernst &
Ernst v. H ochfelder, supra, at .~95; United Sta;tes v. Brown,
555 F. 2d 336, 338-339 (CA2 1977).
.
.
This conclusion is amply supported .by reference .to the .leg.islative record. The breadth of Congress'
purpose
is most
.
•
0
'l •
clearly demonstrated by the Senate.Repo~t :
·
"The purpose of this bill is to protect the investing
public and honest business. . . . The aim is to prevent
further exploitation of the public by the sale of unsound,
fraudulent, and worthless securities through misrepre..
sentation; to place adequate and true information before
the investor; to protect honest enterprise, seeking capital
~ by ho1~~st JJ,r.e~ent~tion , against the competition afforded
~'
~,

I

I

.

'

I,

'

''"

I

•

<.:

.:
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by dishonest securities offered to the public through
crooked promotion ; to restore the confidence of the
prospective investor in his ability to select sound securities; to bring into productive channels of industry and
development capital which has grown timid to the point
of hoarding; and to aid in providing employment and
restoring buying and consuming power." S. Rep. No. 47,
73d Cong., 1st Sess., 1 (1933) (emphasis added) .
'While investor protection was a constant preoccupation of the
legislators, the record is also replete with references to the
desire to protect ethical businessmen. See 77 Cong. Rec.
2925 (remarks of Rep. Kelly); id., at 2983 (remarks of Sen.
Fletcher); id., at 3232 (remarks of Sen. Norbeck); S. Rep.
No. 47, 73d Cong .. 1st Ses .. 1 (1933). As Representative
Chapman stated. " [ t] his legislation is designed to protect not
only the investing public but at the same time to protect
honest corporate business." 77 Cong. Rec. 2935.
It is obvious why Congress would want to protect both
investors and financial intermediaries, for the welfare of the
two are inextricably linked-frauds perpetrated upon either
business or investors can rPdound to the detriment of the other
and to the economy as a whole. See generally SEC, Report
of the Special Study of the Securities Markets, H. R. Doc.
No. 95, pt. 1, 88th Cong. , 1st Sess., 9- 11 (1963). Fraudulent
short sales are no exception. 7 Although investors suffered no
immediate financial injury in this case because the brokers
covered the sales by borrowing and then "buying in," the
indirect impact upon investors may be substantial. "Buying
in" is in actuality only a form of insurance for investors and,
like all forms of insurance, has its own costs. Losses suffered
by brokers increase their cost of doing business, and in
the long run investors pay at least part of this cost through
higher brokerage fees. Moreover, unchecked short sale frauds
It bears repeating that respondent was not convicted for short selling,
but for fraudulent short selling.
1

78-561-0PINION
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against brokers would create a level of market uncertainty
that could only work to the detriment of both investors and
the market as a whole. Finally, while the investors here were
shielded from direct injury, that may not always be the case.
Had the brokers been insolvent or unable to borrow, the
investors might well have failed to receive their promised
shares. Entitled to receive shares at one price under the
purchase agreement. they would have had to buy substitute
shares in the market at a higher price. 8 Placing brokers outside the aegis of § 17 (a) would create a loophole in tpe statute that Congress simply did not intend to create.

III
Although the question was not directly presented in the
Government's Petition for Certiorari, respondent asserts a
final, independent argument in support of the judgment
below. That assertion is that the Securities Act of 1933 was
"preoccupied with'·' the regulation of initial public offerings
of securities, and that Congress waited until the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 to regulate abuses in the trading of
securities in the "aftermarket." As Na.ftalin's fraud did not
involve a new offering. he contends that § 17 (a) is inapplicable, and tha.t he should have been prosecuted for violations
of either the specific short selling regulations promulgated
under the 1934 Act,9 or for violations of the general antifraud
8 Although this potential for immroiatc financial injury to investors has
been reduced by the "buy in" regulations, see 17 CFR § 240.10a-2 (1978),
as well as by the provisions of the Securities Investor Protection Act of
1970, see 15 U. S. C. § 78aaa et seq., the potential for indirect injury,
described supra, still remains. Moreover, the:;;e legal requirements did not
exist when the 1933 Act was pas;;ed, and hence at H1at time the kind of
fraud practicE'<~ by respondent might well have caused investors direct
financial injury. The :-~uhsequent enactments do not serve to re:-~tricl the
original ~cope of § 17 (a).
9 See 15 U. S.C. §§ 78g, 78j (a); 12 CFR §§ 220.3, 220.4 (c) (ii), 220..S ·
(d), 224.2 (1978); 17 CFU §240.10a-1 (1978).

ll :
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9

proscriptions of the 1934 Act's §lOb, 15 U.S. C.§ 78j (b), and
the SEC's Rule 10b-5, 17 CFR § 240.10b-5 (1978). Tr. of
Oral Arg. 17- 18; Brief for Respondent 16-17, 22- 24.
Although it is true that the 1933 Act was primarily concerned with the regulation of new offerings, respondent's
argument fails because the antifraud prohibition of § 17 (a)
was meant as a major departure from that limitation. Unlike
much of the rest of the Act, it was intended to cover any
fraudulent scheme in an offer or sale of securities, whether in
the course of an initial distribution or in the course of ordinary
market trading. 1 Loss 130; Douglas & Bates, The Federal
Securities Act of 1933, 43 Yale L. J. 171, 182 (1933); V.
Brudney & M . Chirelstein, Corporate Finance 740 (1972).
This is made abundantly clear both by the statutory language,
which makes no distinctions between the two kinds of trar1s"
actions, and by the Senate Report, which stated:
"The act subjects the sale of old or outstanding secu"
rities to the same criminal penalties and injunctive au"
thority for fraud, deception, or misrepresentation as in
the case of new issues put out after the approval of the
act. In other words, fraud or deception in the sale of
securities may be prosecuted regardless of whether the
security is old or new. or whether or not it is of the class
of securities exempted under sections 11 or 12." S. Rep.
No. 47, 73d Cong., 1st Sess., 4 (1933).
Accord, H. R. Rep. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess., 6 (1933).
Respondent is undoubtedly correct that the two Acts prohibit
some of the same conduct. See 3 Loss 1428. But "[t]he
fact that there may well be some overlap is neither unusual
nor unfortunate." SEC v. National Securities, Inc., 393 U.S.,
at 468. See Edwards v. United States, 312 U. S. 473, 484
(1941). It certainly does not absolve Naftalin of guilt for
the transactions which violated the statute under which he
was convicted.

78-561-0PINION
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IV
This is a criminal case, and we have long held that " 'ambiguity concerning the ambit of criminal statutes should be
resolved in favor of lenity,' " United States v. Culbert, 435
U. S. 371, 379 (1978) , quoting Rewis v. United States, 401
U. S. 808, 812 (1971) , and that a defendant may not "'be
subjected to a penaity unless the words of the statute plainly
impose it,' " United States v. Campos-Serrano, 404 U. S. 293,
297 (1971) , quoting Keppel v. Tiffin Savings Bank, 197 U.S.
356, 362 (1905). See Dunn v. United States,- U. S. - ,
(1979) (slip op., at 12). In this case, however, the words
of the statute do "plainly impose it." Here, "Congress has
conveyed its purpose clearly, and we decline to manufacture
ambiguity where none exists," United States v. Culbert, supra.
';J.'he decision of the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit is
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